![]() These incidents reinforce the need to ensure effective implementation of these processes. Under applicable Australian law, owners and operators are responsible for implementing effective routines and procedures that meet SOLAS requirements. IMO Convention requirementsĬhapter III, Regulation 20 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) requires operational readiness, maintenance, and inspection of lifeboats and rescue boats. TAIC found that the wires were of adequate strength when manufactured, but that the sheathing allowed saltwater ingress, aiding corrosion by retaining water, and prevented external observation. The crew were also unaware of the necessity for greater vigilance and the application of anticorrosive substances during inspections.Įxamples of the damage to Da Dan Xia’s wire slings after failure (Courtesy TAIC) The sheathing prevented the crew from identifying the corrosion and did not allow for lubrication or the application of other corrosion-inhibiting substances. This corrosion had gone undetected inside a plastic sheathing that the manufacturer had fitted to the wire. Subsequent testing confirmed that the sling wires had been significantly weakened by severe corrosion. TAIC identified that the wire pennants parted under tensile overload. The ATSB found that the simulation wires failed due to a combination of incorrect installation and cumulative internal wear from numerous shock loading events that resulted from previous lifeboat launching drills. However, on this occasion, the simulation wires failed allowing the lifeboat to move down the guide rails into the sea. The lifeboat was fitted with simulation wires to prevent it from launching under these circumstances. The ATSB noted that the design of the release mechanism cover plate prevented visual confirmation that the hook was correctly reset.Īquarosa’s free-fall lifeboat release system This left the release hook in a partially disengaged position. The ATSB found that the hydrostatic on-load release mechanism hydraulic cylinder ram had not fully retracted after use, preventing the stopper block from resetting correctly. When the Second Engineer cycled the hydraulic system, the retaining hook was released allowing the lifeboat to move down the launch ramp. The ATSB identified that the Second Engineer accidentally activated the lifeboat’s on-load release mechanism while carrying out a test procedure. One crew member was injured, and the lifeboat launching davit was rendered unserviceable. ![]() This resulted in the lifeboat falling several metres into harbour waters. 9451290) - On 14 April 2014, the wire lifting sling for the ship’s free-fall lifeboat failed catastrophically during recovery of the lifeboat after a routine launching exercise in Wellington, New Zealand. Aquarosa’s Free-fall Lifeboat arrangementĭa Dan Xia (IMO No. ![]()
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